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CONSTRUCTION SURETIES: DON'T PUT ALL YOUR EGGS IN THE
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION BASKET
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the doctrine of equitable subrogation has entitled
a performance or payment bond surety to a claim superior to
that of a construction lender in the event of general contractor
default. Until recently, this superiority extended even to those
situations where the lender had perfected a security interest in
the proceeds in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code.
Several recent decisions have limited or threatened to limit the
surety's traditional subrogation rights, In recognition of these
decisions; and in order to protect its claim to these funds, the
surety should perfect a security interest pursuant to Article 9 of
the U.C.C.
THIS NOTE ANALYZES the competing claims of a payment
or performance bond surety and a construction lender to the
undisbursed proceeds of a construction contract on which the gen-
eral contractor has defaulted. The doctrine of equitable subroga-
tion holds that the surety's claim to the contract funds is superior
to the lender's claim.' This superiority obtains even though the
lender has perfected a security interest in the funds in accordance
with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."),
while the surety has not perfected its security interest, in the
funds.3
This note sets forth the context in which such a dispute will
arise 4 and analyzes the case law which established and extended
the doctrine of equitable subrogation.5 This note argues that the
1. E.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. First Natl Bank, 411 F.2d 755 (1st Cir.
1969); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Long, 245 A.2d 800, 803 (Del. ch. 1968); see,
e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So. 2d (Fla. 1989); Withers, Surety v.
Lenders: Priority of Claims to Contract Funds, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 356, 362-63 (1971).
2. The general contractor's assignment to the surety of its right to the contract funds
is the surety's security interest. See infra note 12.
3. See mnfra text accompanying notes 39-70 (subrogation rights are not considered
security interests under U.C.C. and are not subject to U.C.C. filing requirements).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 8-26.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 27-70.
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surety should perfect a security interest in the contract funds
rather than rely solely on its equitable subrogation rights.' Fi-
nally, this note proposes that the doctrine of equitable subrogation
be limited when applied to the contemporary construction surety
situation.
II. THE SURETY-LENDER DISPUTE
When a general contractor ("contractor") and owner execute
a construction contract, the contractor is often required to obtain
performance and payment bonds from a surety company
("surety").' A performance bond obligates the surety to complete
construction or arrange for completion in the event of the contrac-
tor's default.9 A payment bond protects the owner from mechanics
liens by insuring that laborers, subcontractors, and materialmen
are compensated for their goods and services by the surety should
the contractor default on its payment obligations. 10 Performance
and payment bond sureties generally require the contractor to in-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 71-127.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 128-38.
8. Procurement of performance and payment bonds is generally a prerequisite to
entering into public construction contracts. Chapter 642(1) of the Miller Act requires that
performance and payment bonds be furnished for contracts in excess of $25,000 entered
into with the federal government. Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1988). Most states
impose similar statutory requirements for contracts entered into with state or local govern-
ments. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-222 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 255.05 (1990);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 153.54 (Anderson 1990). Currently, only Delaware, Louisiana,
New York, and Virginia do not require performance and payment bonds for construction
on public contracts.
Generally, there is no statutory bonding requirement for contractors engaged in pri-
vate construction projects. However, many private owners or their construction lenders re-
quire the contractor to furnish either performance or payment bonds or both. See G. NEL-
SON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 836 (2d ed. 1985) ("[o]wners and
lenders frequently seek the participation of some financially responsible third party who
can step in to rectify the contractor's breach or compensate them for the damage it
causes."); J. SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE CON-
STRUCTION PROCESS 301 (2d ed. 1978) (payment bonds often required as means of circum-
venting subcontractor and supplier liens).
9. See generally AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, ARCHITECTS HANDBOOK OF PROFES-
SIONAL PRACTICE, doc. A31 1, at 1-4 (1970) (containing model performance bond with con-
tractual rights of owners in the event of a contractor's default).
10. Id. In the context of a public project, the payment bond is required to protect
laborers and materialmen who are precluded from filing mechanics' liens against a public
building or work. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contractors' Bonds § 44 (1964); Note, A Race to Con-
tract Proceeds: Miller Bond Surety Entitled to All Earned But Unpaid Contract Proceeds




demnify the surety for any funds it expends on its guaranty, and
to secure the indemnity agreement with an assignment of all con-
struction contract receipts to which the contractor is entitled."1
The resulting indemnity agreement typically provides that it con-
stitutes a "security interest" in accordance with the U.C.C.,12 and
that this security interest is additional to all rights that the surety
possesses in law or in equity 13 Nevertheless, sureties rarely per-
fect their security interest by filing it in accordance with U.C.C §
9-302(1),"4 choosing instead to rely on their equitable subrogation
rights."5
After executing the surety bonds, the contractor normally
seeks a construction loan to finance its obligations under the con-
tract.1 6 Like the surety, the lending institution ("lender") receives
11. See Withers, supra note 1, at 357 n.3. Withers provides an example of the typi-
cal indemnity provision found in performance and payment bonds. Under this indemnity
provision, the contractor agrees to assign to the surety, as collateral for the bonds, "[a]ny
and all percentages retained on account of [the construction] contract, and any and all
sums that may be due under said contract at the time of breach, or that thereafter
may become due " Id. The assignment takes effect at the time the bonds are exe-
cuted but is effective only upon an "abandonment, forfeiture, or breach" of the construc-
tion contract or of the bonds. Id., see also Hoffman, Jacobs-Sureties Panacea or Narco-
sis? Article 9-The Uniform Commercial Code--Some Practical Aspects, 52 INS. CoUNs.
J. 387, 388 (1967) (indemnity agreements typically include an assignment of the contrac-
tor's rights in equipment and materials used during construction).
12. The U.C.C. defines "security interest" as "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation The term also in-
cludes any interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject
to Article 9." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1989). A security interest is created by agreement
between creditor and debtor and "attaches" when the following conditions exist: (1) either
the secured creditor is in possession of the collateral or else the debtor has signed an agree-
ment adequately describing the collateral; (2) value has been given; and (3) the debtor has
rights in the collateral. Id. § 9-203(1). In order to be enforceable as against holders of
junior liens or subsequent purchasers, the security interest must be properly "perfected."
Depending on the type of collateral involved, a security interest is properly perfected by
filing a financing statement in the designated public office, by taking possession of the
collateral, or automatically by attachment. See id. §§ 9-302 to 9-305, 9-401 to 9-403. Sec-
tion 9-312 governs the priority of security interests. A perfected security interest has prior-
ity over an unperfected interest, while priority as between two perfected interests is deter-
mined by which interest is filed or perfected first. Id. § 9-301(1), 9-312(5).
13. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 524 So. 2d 439, 441 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988), rev d on other grounds, 540 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1989). In Transamerica the
indemnity agreement contained a provision allowing the surety to exercise its U.C.C. rights
without limiting its other rights. Id. at 441 n.2.
14. The U.C.C. provides that, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, "[a] financ-
ing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests " U.C.C. § 9-302(1)
(1989).
15. Transamerica, 524 So. 2d at 441; Withers, supra note 1, at 357.
16. Withers, supra note 1, at 357; Note, Equitable Subrogation-Too Hardy a
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as collateral an assignment of contract funds to become due and
payable to the contractor. Unlike the surety, however, the lender
normally perfects its security interest by filing under U.C.C § 9-
302.17
Construction contracts customarily require the owner to
make periodic progress payments to the contractor."" This pay-
ment scheme enables contractors to engage in costly and lengthy
projects without incurring the responsibility of financing the en-
deavor.1" However, owners typically mitigate this dilemma
through the practice of retainage. Construction contracts custom-
arily permit the owner to withhold a certain percentage of each
progress payment, usually ten percent, until the contractor has
completed the project to the owner's satisfaction.20 This retainage
is withheld to discourage abandonment by the contractor.21 Thus,
the owner will have in its possession three types of contract funds
during the executory period: earned but unpaid progress pay-
ments, unearned progress payments, and retainage.22
The dispute between the surety and lender over the funds re-
maining in the possession of the owner arises when the contractor
Plant to Be Uprooted by Article 9 of the U.C.C?, 32 U. PirT. L. REv. 580, 581 (1971). In
some cases, the contractor will draw on an existing line of credit rather than seek a new
source of financing.
17. Withers, supra note 1, at 357. The assignment of the contract funds to the lender
does not fall under the exceptions listed in section 9-302(1). In order to perfect its security
interest in such funds, the bank must file a financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-302 official
comment 5 (1989).
18. Withers, supra note 1, at 358.
19. American States Ins. Co. v. Glover Constr. Co. (In re Glover Constr. Co.), 30
Bankr. 873, 875-76 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
20. See, e.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 411 F.2d 755,
758 (Ist Cir. 1969) ("retainage is a security for protection against failure of completion.").
21. See Glover, 30 Bankr. at 876-77 (retainage is an incentive to completion); With-
ers, supra note I, at 358 (retained funds protect the owner by inducing the contractor to
finish the job).
22. See Withers, supra note 1, at 358. This note does not discuss earned progress
payments which have been paid to the contractor or the lender prior to default. The surety
is without recourse to recover these funds. E.g., United States Pac. Ins. Co. v. United
States, 362 F.2d 805, 808 (Ct. Cl. 1966) ("The right of subrogation of the surety, though
superior to claims of other private parties, does not extend to prior payments lawfully
disbursed under the contract to the contractor before his default."); Note, National
Shawmut Bank: Another Step Toward Confusion in Surety Law, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 582,
590 n.38, 596 (1969) (sureties are unable to recover progress payments earned and paid
prior to the default); see, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
411 F.2d 843, 848, reh'g denied, 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) ("Prior to default, the
contractor had the right to assign progress payments and had the Bank received payment,




fails to complete the project and ceases work in breach of the con-
struction contract.3 Such a breach triggers the performance and
payment obligations of the surety under the executed bonds.2 4 A
surety which satisfies its obligations under the performance and
payment bonds may claim entitlement to the available contract
funds under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.25 On the other
hand, a lender may assert a claim to the funds under its properly
perfected security interest under the U.C.C. z6
III. DEVELOPMENT AND PROMINENCE OF THE EQUITABLE
SUBROGATION DOCTRINE
Sureties consistently have been successful in the adjudication
of surety-lender disputes.2 7 Courts view the surety's rights under
the equitable subrogation doctrine2s as superior to the lender's
rights acquired through perfection of a security interest in the as-
signed funds.2 9
In Pearlman v Reliance Insurance Co.,30 the Supreme Court
of the United States firmly established the surety's superior equi-
table subrogation rights.31 In Pearlman the Dutcher Construction
23. Note, supra note 16, at 582.
24. Id. The breach also effectuates the assignments made in the indemnity agree-
ment. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, 427 F.2d 856 (1st
Cir. 1970); Home Indem. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Note, supra
note 16, at 585.
26. See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d
843, reh'g denied, 411 F.2d 483 (ist Cir. 1969); Note, supra note 16, at 589.
27. Withers, supra note 1, at 362; see also, e.g., Hardaway v. National Sur. Co., 211
U.S. 552 (1909) (performance bond surety has priority over lender); Henningsen v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908) (payment bond surety has priority over lender).
28. Subrogation has been defined as:
[T]he equitable remedy by which, where the property of one person is used to
discharge a duty of another or a lien upon the property of another, under such
circumstances that the other will be unjustly enriched by the retention of the
benefit thus conferred, the former is placed in the position of the obligee or
lienholder.
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 141, comment a, at 383 (1941); see also National Shawmut,
411 F.2d at 844 (Subrogation is an "equitable principle that when one, pursuant to
obligation - not a volunteer, fulfills the duties of another, he is entitled to assert the rights
.of that other against third persons."). See generally In Re V Pangori & Sons, Inc., 53
Bankr. 711, 715-16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (when a surety satisfies the debts of its
principal, the surety receives an equitable assignment of the creditor's rights against the
principal).
29. Withers, supra note 1, at 362-363; see cases cited supra note 1.
30. 371 U.S: 132 (1962).
31. Id. at 136-37, 141.
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Corp., as contractor, and the United States, as owner, entered into
a construction contract in connection with the St. Lawrence Sea-
way Due to financial difficulties encountered by the contractor,
the contract was terminated by mutual agreement, and another
contractor completed the job. There remained, however, numerous
unpaid labor and material claims against the original contractor.
Reliance Insurance Company, payment bond surety for Dutcher,
satisfied these debts. 2 Subsequently, the contractor was adjudi-
cated bankrupt, and the United States turned over the retainage
to the trustee. The surety then sued to recover the retainage from
the trustee, claiming superior right and title to these funds.33
The Court held in favor of the surety under subrogation
principles.
Traditionally sureties compelled to pay debts for their prin-
cipal have been deemed entitled to reimbursement, even without
a contractual promise And probably there are few doc-
trines better established than that a surety who pays the debt of
another is entitled, to all the rights of the person he paid to en-
force his right to be reimbursed.3 4
The Court concluded that the surety, having discharged labor and
material claims, was subrogated to (1) the rights of the owner to
use the retained funds to pay laborers and materialmen; (2) the
laborers' and materialmen's rights to be paid out of the retainage
fund; and (3) the contractor's right to the retainage insofar as the
surety had satisfied the contractor's payment obligations.35
Subsequent case law has extended equitable subrogation
rights beyond recovery of retainage funds to include recovery of
unearned progress payments3 6 and earned but unpaid progress
32. Id. at 133-34.
33. Id. at 134.
34. Id. at 136-37 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 141-42. In reaching its decision, the Pearlman Court relied on two prior
Supreme Court decisions. The first of these, Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S.
227 (1896), involved competing claims to a retainage fund between a project completing
surety and a bank which had obtained an assignment of the retamage from the contractor.
The Court held in favor of the surety, finding it subrogated to the rights of the government-
owner to protect itself out of the fund. Id. at 232-33. The second case, Henningsen v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908), involved a similar dispute, ex-
cept that the surety was seeking reimbursement for payments made to unpaid laborers and
materialmen. The Court held in favor of the surety, recognizing the same type of equitable
subrogation rights espoused in Prairie State Bank. Henningsen, 208 U.S. at 410. The
Pearlman Court described these two cases as "establish[ing] the surety's right to subroga-
tion whether its bond be for performance or payment." Pearlman, 371 U.S. at 139.
36. E.g., Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.
[Val. 41:305
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payments."' More importantly, these later decisions have held that
the surety's equitable subrogation rights were not vitiated by the
provisions of Article 9 of the U.C.C.3s
A few years after Pearlman was decided, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in Jacobs v Northeastern Corp.,39 held that a
surety's equitable subrogation rights are neither governed nor in-
validated by Article 9 of the U.C.C.40 In Jacobs the contractor
entered into two construction contracts with the state, each of
which required a payment and performance bond surety On both
projects, the contractor failed to pay laborers and materialmen,
and the sureties were called on to satisfy the unpaid claims. When
the contractor fell into receivership, a dispute developed between
the receiver and the surety as to the final payments due under
each contract.4' The court, citing Pearlman, held for the sureties
under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 2
The Jacobs court held that each surety had an equitable
claim to the disputed funds even though no financing statement
was filed in accordance with the U.C.C. This ruling is based on a
distinction between a U.C.C. security interest and equitable sub-
rogation rights. The court reasoned that Article 9 extends only to
"security interests created by contract," while subrogation rights
arise as a matter of law independent of contractual provisions.
Consequently, valid subrogation rights exist despite the absence of
a filing under the U.C.C.41
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
37. E.g., National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843,
845, 848, reh'g denied, 411 F.2d 843 (ist Cir. 1969).
38. See, e.g., Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir.
1984); Mickelson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. (In re J.V Gleason Co.), 452 F.2d 1219
(8th Cir. 1971); National Shawmut, 411 F.2d 843; Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank,
540 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1989); Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49
(1965); R. Smith & V Covalt, Should the Surety Stand on its Equitable Subrogation
Rights or File its Indemnity Agreement Under the Uniform Commercial Code? 14 (Sept.
11-13, 1985) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1985 Surety Claims Seminar,
Westfield Center, Ohio).
39. 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965).
40. Id. at 427-29, 206 A.2d at 54-55. The court so ruled even though Pennsylvania
was the first state to enact the U.C.C. Cramer, Uniform Commercial Code: Surety v.
Lender, 3 FORUM 295, 300 (1967).
41. Jacobs, 416 Pa. at 419, 206 A.2d at 50.
42. Id. at 427, 206 A.2d at 54.
43. Id. at 429, 206 A.2d at 55. The Jacobs court noted further that awarding the
funds to the surety on equitable subrogation principles is not inconsistent with the notice
objectives of Article 9 filing requirements and does not adversely affect the contractor's
creditors. This is not a case in which creditors might be deceived about the contractor's
1990]
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Similarly the First Circuit, in National Shawmut Bank v
New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,44 concluded that "equitable subro-
gation is too hardy a plant to be uprooted by a Code which speaks
around but not to the issue."'45 National Shawmut involved a con-
tractor's default on three Air Force base construction contracts. A
dispute followed between the performance bond surety and con-
struction lender over earned but unpaid progress payments held
by the federal government-owner."
The National Shawmut court focused on several sections of
the U.C.C., as adopted by Massachusetts. The court referred to
the "exculpatory general principle" found in section 1-103 that
principles of law and equity supplement provisions of the U.C.C.
unless displaced by a particular provision of the code.47 The court
then held that subrogation rights fall outside the definition of "se-
curity interest" under section 1-201(37). The court found that the
surety's opportunity to minimize its losses by completing the pro-
ject with available funds did not constitute an interest in personal
property or a fixture.48 The court also observed that a surety is not
a buyer of contract rights subject to Article 941 The court then
applied the same analysis to section 9-102(1) holding it inapplica-
ble to the surety's equitable subrogation rights. 50
In an analysis parallel to that of Jacobs,51 the court held that
section 9-102(2) was inapplicable to subrogation rights in that as
available assets. To the contrary, creditors certainly know of statutory and customary
bonding requirements as well as the possibility of surety claims to contract funds upon
default by the contractor. Moreover, because of the default, the contract funds do not
become due and payable to the contractor. Therefore, creditors cannot reach these funds.
Id. at 428-29, 206 A.2d at 54-55.
44. 411 F.2d 843, reh g denied, 411 F.2d 843 (ist Cir. 1969). For an excellent anal-
ysis of National Shawnmut, see Note, supra note 22.
45. National Shawmut, 411 F.2d at 849.
46. Id. at 844.
47. Id. at 845.
48. Id at 845-46.
49. Id. at 846. In 1972 the U.C.C. eliminated "contract right" as a defined term and
expanded the definition of "account." See infra note 53.
50. National Shawnut, 411 F.2d at 846. The current version of section 9-102(l)
provides that:
Except as otherwise provided in section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Ar-
ticle applies (a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to
create a security interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, docu-
ments, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also
(b) to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
U.C.C. § 9-102(l) (1989).
51. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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such rights were not "created by contract."52 The court then ex-
amined the definitions of "account" and "contract right" con-
tained in section 9-106, and determined that neither definition en-
compassed equitable subrogation. 3
Finally, the court relied on the rejection of proposed section
9-312(7). This provision would have subordinated a surety's secur-
ity interest to a subsequent security interest.54  However, the
U.C.C. Editorial Board deleted this provision in order to preserve
the existing law 55 The National Shawmut court viewed the rejec-
tion of section 9-312(7) as evidence of an intent to preserve the
superiority of the surety's equitable subrogation rights.5 6
In Mickelson v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (In re J V
Gleason Co.), 57 the Eighth Circuit echoed the rationales set forth
in Jacobs and National Shawmut. Gleason involved a dispute
similar to that which occurred in Pearlman. The contractor in
Gleason defaulted on five state construction contracts and subse-
quently was declared bankrupt. The payment and performance
52. National Shawmut, 411 F.2d at 846 (subrogation rights not created by contract
but by "status, resulting from a contract").
53. The court found an account distinct from subrogation in that default on an ac-
count does not yield a right to payment. A contract right entails "a right to receive pay-
ments from one who continues with the performance rather than a right conditioned
on performance by the transferee of the 'right.'" Id. at 846. Prior to 1972, the U.C.C.
distinguished "contract rights" (amounts not yet earned by performance) from "accounts"
(amounts which have been earned by performance). U.C.C. § 9-106 (1989) (section
amended 1972); Hoffman, supra note 11, at 388. In 1972, the Code eliminated the term
"contract right" and extended the definition of "account" to include "any right to payment
for goods or services whether or not it has been earned by performance."
U.C.C § 9-106. It was determined that the distinction was unnecessary since it was not
used in Article 9 except in section 9-318(2). U.C.C. § 9-106 (official reasons for 1972
amendments). Consequently, the change does not have any substantive impact and has no
effect on the continuing validity of pre-1972 decisions. Id.
54. Proposed section 9-312(7) stated:
A security interest which secures an obligation to reimburse a surety Is
subordinate to a later security interest given to a secured party who makes a new
advance, incurs a new obligation, releases a perfected security interest or gives
other new value to enable the debtor to perform the obligation for which the
earlier secured party is liable.
U.C.C. § 9-312(7) (original text of Proposed Official Draft 1952) (not adopted).
55. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 393. The Editorial Board commented that the sub-
section "was a 'complete reversal' of the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court and other
courts." R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 14.
56. National Shawmut, 411 F.2d at 846. But see Hoffman, supra note 11, at 394
(arguing that section 9-312(7) was rejected to establish equality between sureties and cred-
itors with priority determined by the order of filing or perfection under the U.C.C.).
57. 452 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1971) (interpreting the U.C.C. as adopted by
Minnesota).
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bond surety asserted that its rights in the retainage funds were
superior to those of the trustee in bankruptcy 11
The Gleason court held that subrogation rights were not
"consensual security arrangements" and therefore fell outside the
scope of U.C.C. section 9-102.1 The court restated the rationale
set forth in Jacobs that, the notice objectives of Article 9 would
not be served by subjecting the surety's subrogation rights to filing
requirements."0 Citing National Shawmut and the official com-
ment to section 9-101, the court found that the difference between
suretyship and commercial lending was compelling and held that
the provisions of Article 9 were inapplicable to the former type of
transaction."'
The Gleason court went further than Jacobs and National
Shawmut, offering additional analytical grounds for its holding.
For example, the court found that section 9-104(f)62 placed the
surety's equitable subrogation rights outside the Code.63 The court
also held that, even if covered, subrogation rights are exempt from
U.C.C. filing requirements under section 9-302(1)(e).6 Finally,
58. Id. at 1220.
59. Id. at 1222. The court, relying on the official comment to section 9-102, stated
that "the equitable lien does not arise from the consent of the parties or by their
intent, but by operation of law." Id.
60. Id. at 1223 (quoting Jacobs, 416 Pa. at 429, 206 A.2d at 55). For an analysis of
the Jacobs courts' consideration of the need for notice, see supra note 43 and accompany-
ing text.
61. Id. at 1222-23. The court stated:
Suretyship and general financing arrangements are different conceptually and
there is no valid reason to paint them with the same broad brush, nor is filing for
the sake of filing a cogent reason for favoring the trustee and general creditors
over a surety who has suffered the direct loss on performance. To introduce fur-
ther complications of filing so-called financing arrangements, which are not in
fact true financing arrangements, where no legitimate purpose is served is a
waste of time and energy.
Id. at 1224.
62. Section 9-104(f) excludes from Article 9 coverage a sale, assignment, or transfer
of accounts or chattel paper to an assignee who is to render performance under the con-
tract. U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1989).
63. Gleason, 452 F.2d at 1224. For an argument that section 9-104(0 was not in-
tended to exclude surety transactions but rather was intended to apply to those situations
where there is a total assignment of rights and delegation of duties under the contract, see
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 973-74 (1965).
64. Gleason, 452 F.2d at 1224. Section 9-302(1)(e) excludes from filing require-
ments "an assignment of accounts which does not alone or in conjunction with other assign-
ments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts of the
assignor." U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e) (1989). In finding subrogation rights exempt, the Gleason
court cited the official comment to Minnesota's version of section 9-302: "'This paragraph
exempts from the filing requirement assignments of accounts or contract rights which are
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the court examined the legislature's failure to expressly apply the
U.C.C. to subrogation rights and inferred that such an application
was not intended: "[B]efore the Uniform Commercial Code, the
doctrine of equitable subrogation in suretyship cases was firmly
established and the question of whether this doctrine should be
discarded is certainly a legislative one. The doctrine should not be
abolished obliquely by labeling or mislabeling certain transactions
as 'security interests.'-"'
Although some recently decided cases are in conflict with the
traditional notion of the surety's superior equitable subrogation
rights," the principles enunciated in Pearlman, Jacobs, National
Shawmut, and Gleason generally have prevailed in recent fed-
eral,67 state," and bankruptcy court69 decisions. The doctrine of
equitable subrogation, as applied in nearly every jurisdiction,
grants payment and performance bond sureties a superior claim to
undisbursed contract funds over the lender with a perfected secur-
ity interest in such funds. 0
out of the ordinary course of financing.'" Gleason, 452 F.2d. at 1224 (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 336.9-302 official comment to paragraph (e) (1989)).
65. Id. at 1224.
66. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders (In re Universal Builders), 53
Bankr. 183 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (nonperfecting surety possessed no equitable rights
in progress payments entitling it to adequate protection under bankruptcy laws); In re V
Pangori & Sons, 53 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (rights of trustee in bankruptcy
and creditor bank superior to rights of surety to construction contract settlement proceeds);
T. Leo, The Financing Surety and Chapter II Principal at I1 (January, 1989) (unpub-
lished paper presented at 1989 Joint Program sponsored by the American Bar Association
Forum on the Construction Industry and the Fidelity and Surety Law Committee of the
Tort and Insurance Practice Section, New York, New York). For a detailed discussion of
the cases departing from the traditional equitable subrogation doctrine, see infra notes 71-
112 and accompanying text.
67. See, eg., Ram Constr. Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir.
1984) (supporting theory that surety's subrogation right is superior to rights of secured and
general creditors).
68. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1989);
Third Nat'l Bank v. Highlands Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1980). For a discussion of
the Transamerica decision, see infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., In re Ward Land Clearing & Drainage, 73 Bankr. 313 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1987); City Bank & Trust Co. v. Don's Electric (In re Don's Electric), 65 Bankr. 399
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986).
70. J. Sheak & T. Korzun, Current Case Law Having an Impact on the Surety's
Traditional Rights 13-14 (June, 1988) (unpublished paper presented at the 1988 Surety
Claims Institute, Lincolnshire, Illinois).
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IV WHY THE SURETY SHOULD FILE ITS INDEMNITY
AGREEMENT AS A SECURITY INTEREST UNDER THE U.C.C.
Despite the widespread acceptance of the equitable subroga-
tion doctrine, sureties should consider perfecting their security in-
terests in contract funds by filing their indemnity agreements
under the U.C.C. The following sections set forth the arguments
for such a course of action.
A. Erosion of the Equitable Subrogation Doctrine
Several recent decisions limit or threaten to limit the surety's
traditional subrogation rights.7 1 For example, the 1988 decision by
the Florida District Court of Appeals in Transamerica Insurance
Co. v Barnett Bank72 completely departed from the holdings and
rationales of Pearlman, Jacobs, National Shawmut, and Gleason.
Although this decision was overturned by the Florida Supreme
Court in 1989,73 it is worthwhile to revisit the lower court's rea-
soning. Because equitable subrogation is a federal common law
doctrine, it is not binding on state courts interpreting the U.C.C.
or ruling on disputes involving non-federal projects governed by
state law 71 Thus, the well-established Supreme Court precedent
does not foreclose the possibility that other jurisdictions will adopt
the position of the intermediate appellate court in Transamerica.
Transamerica involved a question of priority between the per-
formance and payment bond surety and the construction financing
bank as to earned but unpaid progress payments held by the
owner after the contractor's default.7 5 The appellate court based
its ruling in favor of the lender over the surety on both policy and
legal rationales.7 6
71. See, e.g., In re V Pangori & Sons, 53 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985);
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Universal Builders (In re Universal Builders), 53 Bankr. 183 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1985); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 524 So.2d 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988), revd, 540 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1989); see also T. Leo, supra note 66, at 11-14; J.
Sheak & T. Korzun, supra note 70, at 14-28.
72. 524 So. 2d 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 540 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1989).
73. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1989).
74. Transamerica, 524 So. 2d at 443, rev'd on other grounds, 540 So. 2d 113 (Fla.
1989); R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 13, 21; see also Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
75. Transanerca, 524 So. 2d at 441. The facts in Transamerica are similar to those
in Pearlman, Jacobs, National Shawmut, and Gleason. See supra notes 28-70 and accom-
panying text.
76. Id. at 443-44.
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First, the Transamerica court observed that when the United
States is not in the position of owner and party litigant, the As-
signment of Claims Act and the Miller Act are inapposite. There-
fore, state law determines the priority question.7 Next, the court
noted that the doctrine of equitable subrogation was developed
through federal construction contract cases in the pre-1940 era
when neither the surety nor the bank could secure a "valid" as-
signment against the United States."' The Transamerca court
also disregarded federal policies which it considered irrelevant to
state judicial decisions, such as favoring sureties because they di-,
rectly assist the United States in construction completion. 9 Fi-
nally, the court found that the purpose of the Miller Act in requir-
ing surety bonds is to ensure that laborers and materialmen have
protection not afforded by mechanics' lien statutes. Granting pri-
ority to sureties, however, is not necessary to achieving this
purpose.80
The Transamerica appellate court held that the surety's in-
demnity agreement "constitute[d] a security interest subject to
the filing and perfection requirements of [the U.C.C.]"811 Turning
to the exemption provisions of section 9-104(f), the court rejected
an argument that this section was intended to place assignments
to sureties outside Article 9,82 ruling that "section [9-104(f)] was
intended to exclude transfers, not for security, in which the as-
signee of the construction contract takes over the contract and re-
ceives an assignment of rights and assumes the contractor's duty
of performance." 83 The appellate court criticized the inferences
the National Shawmut court drew from the rejection of proposed
U.C.C. § 9-312(7),"' reasoning that "deletion of the proposed spe-
cial priority rule merely put the problem back into the general
77. Id. at 443.
78. Id. The federal Assignment of Claims Act validated assignments to banks and
motivated federal courts to continue to apply equitable subrogation principles to afford
sureties a remedy. Id.
79. Id. at 443-44.
80. Id. at 444.
81. Id.
82. But see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
83. Transamerica, 524 So. 2d at 444; see also In re Kuhn Constr. Co., 11 Bankr.
746, 749 (Bankr. S.D.W Va. 1981) (section 9-104(0 exclusion not applicable to surety
because surety may engage another contractor to complete performance); 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 63, at 973-74.
84. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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priority rule, U.C.C. § 9-312(5) "585 The court then inter-
preted section 9-312(5) as granting priority to the party perfecting
its interest first, regardless of knowledge of outstanding interests.8
The appellate court found that its holding would engender an effi-
cient filing system which would, in turn, promote efficient com-
merce generally 87
The Transamerica appellate court concluded that where the
surety possessed, but failed to take advantage of, an adequate
remedy at law, it should not be able to recover under the doctrine
of equitable subrogation. Had this ruling withstood review, it
would have required sureties to perfect their security interest in
available contract funds before other creditors in order to main-
tain the priority previously afforded by equitable subrogation. The
court was not persuaded that this requirement would work a hard-
ship on sureties, noting that even where a creditor has a prior,
perfected claim, a surety can refuse to issue a bond unless the
bank agrees to subordinate its interest to the surety 88
The Transamerica appellate decision is not alone in its depar-
ture from the majority position. Several recent bankruptcy court
decisions have limited a surety's equitable subrogation rights in
much the same way 89 In Great American Insurance Co. v Un-
versal Builders (In re Universal Builders),9° a contractor filed a
Chapter 11 petition, yet continued to work on nine Miller Act
projects. The surety filed a motion for adequate protection,"' seek-
ing to limit the contractor-debtor-in-possession's use of progress
85. Transamerica, 524 So. 2d at 444 n.13; see also Hoffman supra note 11, at 393-
94 (arguing that even with the rejection of section 9-312(7), surety should be required
proceed under its legal assignment in accordance with the U.C.C.).
86. Transamerica, 524 So. 2d at 445 ("Because knowledge is a subjective question,
easy to allege and argue but difficult to disprove, its controlling importance in a commer-
cial system greatly impedes commerce ").
87. Id.
88. Id. at 446. Similar arguments were espoused more than twenty years earlier. See,
e.g., Hoffman, supra note 1I, at 393-94; Note, Suretyship: Subrogation under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 933 (1965); Note, supra note 22, at 593-95.
89. See In re V Pangon & Sons, 53 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (for a
detailed discussion of Pangori, see infra notes 100-12); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Universal
Builders (In re Universal Builders), 53 Bankr. 183 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (for a de-
tailed discussion of Universal Builders, see infra notes 90-99); see also J. Sheak & T.
Korzun, supra note 70, at 22 (commenting that these decisions "are illustrative of the
policy choice of the bankruptcy courts to enlarge the general assets of the estate as much
as possible.").
90. 53 Bankr. 183 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985).
91. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1988) (defining "adequate protection").
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payments to satisfaction of labor and material claims for which
the surety was contingently liable.9 2 The court denied the motion,
noting that the surety had failed to perfect its indemnity agree-
ment under the U.C.C. 93 The court held that the surety "ha[d] no
equitable right in the progress payments which would entitle it to
adequate protection." 94 Specifically, the court recognized that the
surety, upon discharge of the claims of laborers and materialmen,
would be subrogated to the rights of such persons. However, such
claimants were deemed unsecured creditors of the estate. 95 The
court concluded, therefore, that the surety also occupied the posi-
tion of unsecured creditor.96 This holding is appropriate since a
surety possesses "no greater rights than those of the person whose
rights he is asserting.19
7
Critical to the Universal Builders holding was the distinction
drawn between retainage funds and progress payments in In re
Glover Construction Co.9 Focusing on this distinction, the Uni-
versal Builders court limited the equitable subrogation principles
espoused in Pearlman to retainage funds and refused to apply
those principles to progress payments. 99
92. Universal Builders, 53 Bankr. at 184-85.
93. Id. at 186.
94. Id. at 187.
95. Id. The court offered no rationale for this conclusion. See J. Sheak & T. Korzun,
supra note 70, at 25-26 (discussing the inconsistency of Universal Builders with other fed-
eral cases).
96. Universal Builders, 53 Bankr. at 187; see also Haug & Haug, Bankruptcy 1984
vs. the Surety's Rights to Contract Proceeds, 20 FORUM 725, 745-46 (1985) (warning that
"[r]elymg solely on the subrogation to the right of laborers and materalman can be dan-
gerous. The surety's subrogation to the rights of the owner and debtor can be far more
effective in the bankruptcy context."). Universal Builders is troubling due to the court's
failure to consider the surety's subrogation to the right of the owner to use earned but
unpaid progress payments to satisfy the claims of unpaid labor and material claims. Com-
pare National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d 843, 845, 848,
reh'g denied, 411 F.2d 843 (ist Cir. 1969) (surety is subrogated to owner's right to apply
earned but unpaid progress payments to completion costs); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v.
United States, 382 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968) (stat-
ing that if the surety undertakes the completion of the project, it has the right to defray
costs with the retained funds and remaining progress payments). Arguably, this right of
subrogation would justify giving the surety adequate protection. But see infra note 105 and
accompanying text (discussing a court's rejection of such a subrogation right as applied to
a payment bond surety).
97. R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 12.
98. 30 Bankr. 873, 875-77 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983). The Glover court characterized
retainage as an "indemnity resource for unpaid subcontractor's claims or guarantor pay-
ments of claims of secondary parties" and progress payments as "funds which the owner
contracts to pay periodically based upon satisfactory performance " Id. at 875, 877.
99. Universal Builders, 53 Bankr. at 186. This limitation is in derogation of the ma-
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In In re V Pangori & Sons,100 a contractor defaulted on a
construction contract entered into with the City of Sterling
Heights, Michigan. After notification that its contract had been
terminated, the contractor filed for Chapter 11 protection and ob-
tained a post-petition bank loan to provide working capital for
other, ongoing projects. As security, the lending bank was given
priority status in all unencumbered assets of the bankrupt.' A
settlement between Sterling Heights and the contractor was
reached regarding the latter's claims under the construction con-
tract, and the bankruptcy court issued an order awarding the set-
tlement amount to the bank. 02 The surety then moved to vacate
the order, claiming that the equitable subrogation doctrine gave it
a superior right to the funds.'0 3
The Pangori court followed the majority view and held that
the surety's equitable subrogation rights were outside the scope of
the U C.C. °4 Nonetheless, the court held the rights of the trustee
and the assignee bank to be superior to those of the surety In so
holding, the court dismissed Pearlman as non-binding precedent,
stating that "federal common law interpretations of surety's
rights" did not apply to this non-Miller Act project. 05
The cornerstone of the Pangori court's decision was its hold-
ing that a surety's equitable subrogation rights arise only when
the surety becomes obligated to perform under the executed
bonds, which, in the case of a payment bond, occurs when laborers
or materialmen demand payment. In addition, the court held that
jority view that the doctrine of equitable subrogation is fully applicable to unearned and
earned but unpaid progress payments, as well as retainage. See supra notes 36-37 and
accompanying text.
100. 53 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985).
101. Id. at 713-14.
102. Id. The bankruptcy court granted an ex parte motion by the receiver, who was
later appointed trustee, approving an assignment to the bank of all proceeds due under the
Sterling Heights contract. Id.
103. Id. The surety also claimed a superior right pursuant to a contract of indemnity
which the surety believed was not governed by the U.C.C. filing requirements. Id.
104. Id. at 717. The court noted that the right of subrogation does not depend on an
express contractual grant but is created by operation of law to avoid injustice and, thus, is
not a security interest governed by Article 9. Id., see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 718. The Pangorz court further distinguished Pearlman. In denying the
surety's asserted subrogation to the government-owner's rights, the court stated that unpaid
laborers and materialmen were not creditors of the government-owner insofar as the latter
had no obligation to ensure that the former were paid. Id. at 721. The court commented
that "the payment bond is 'solely for the protection of' laborers and materialmen; not
for the benefit of the municipality." Id. (construing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 129.203 (1985).
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such rights do not relate back to the date of execution of the
bonds.106 In Pangori no demand for payment had been made at
the time of the bankruptcy filing. Accordingly, the trustee's rights
as a judicial lien creditor 107 and the bank's rights as the trustee's
assignee defeated the surety's equitable subrogation rights.10 8
Cases such as Transamerica, Universal Builders, and
Pangori clearly depart from the majority view of a surety's equita-
ble subrogation rights. These opinions illustrate that such rights
are not invincible. These decisions erode the doctrine of equitable
subrogation and encourage lenders to fight vigorously over the
right to contract funds.10 9 By engaging in the relatively simple
task 1 of filing its indemnity agreement under the U.C.C. before
the lender perfects its assignment of contract funds, the surety
will have clearly established its superior right to such funds.1"' By
106. Id. at 720, 721. The court based this holding on an extension of principles set
forth in Earl Dubey & Sons v. Macomb Contracting Corp., 97 Mich. App. 553, 559, 296
N.W.2d 582, 585 (1980) (equitable subrogation rights accrue when contractor is in default
and surety is obligated to perform). The principle enunciated in Pangori is contrary to the
overwhelming majority of cases which hold that equitable subrogation rights relate back to
the date of execution of the performance or payment bond.. See, e.g., cases cited supra
notes 27-28; J. Sheak & T. Korzun, supra note 70, at 18 n.38.
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1988) (stating that "[t]he trustee shall have
the rights and powers of a creditor that extends credit to the debtor and that
obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property, on
which a creditor could have obtained such a judicial lien ").
108. Pangor, 53 Bankr. at 721.
109. See R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 15 ("[Tjhe desperate situation of
creditors of a failed contractor probably assures that the attacks will continue.").
110. While filing entails the expenditure of time and money, including the procure-
ment of specialized U.C.C. forms, determination of the appropriate filing office, and the
payment of-filing fees, these costs are trifling as compared to the potential costs of extended
litigation. See R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 40. Moreover, most indemnity
agreements provide that the agreement constitutes a financing statement in accordance
with the U.C.C., thus allowing the surety to file the original agreement bearing both the
surety's and the contractor-debtor's signatures. See T. Leo, supra note 66, at 15.
11I. R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 17. One potential problem is that the
lender may already have filed a financing statement, thus vesting it with a superior claim to
the funds. Often this occurs where the lender has filed a prior "blanket" or "dragnet"
financing statement. Such statements perfect a security interest in the present accounts of
the contractor as well as those which may arise in the future. See Hoffman, supra note 11,
at 389; Note, supra note 16, at 592 (lender may be able to keep a financing statement on
file for future contracts entered into by a regular customer, thereby taking priority over the
surety's security interest).
Where the lender files a blanket financing statement, the U.C.C. rules governing
purchase money security interests allow the surety to gain priority over the lender by filing
its security interest. U.C.C. § 9-107 provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
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utilizing the protection offered by the U.C.C., the surety will en-
hance the predictability and clarity of its rights. The end result
will be a substantial savings in time, money, and efficiency 112
B. Procurement of Set-Off Rights
Perfection of its security interest allows a surety to attach the
contractor's profits from projects unrelated to the project that
triggers the surety's performance and to apply these profits
against the surety's performance losses. 113 These surplus funds
would be unavailable to the surety under the equitable subroga-
tion doctrine." 4
An example may help illustrate the significance of this dis-
tinction. Suppose a contractor and the federal government enter
into two separate construction contracts (K1 and K2) for two
projects each to be completed within one year at a price of
$120,000 per project and calling for monthly progress payments of
$10,000 per project."' Since both projects qualify as public con-
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if
such value is in fact so used.
U.C.C. § 9-107 (1989).
The surety's execution of the indemnity agreement qualifies it as a holder of a
"purchase money security interest" as defined by U.C.C. § 9-107(b). Because the surety
has a purchase money security interest it will have priority over a conflicting security inter-
est in the same collateral or its proceeds "if the purchase money security interest is per-
fected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereaf-
ter." U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1989). Thus, as long as the surety files the indemnity agreement
either before execution of the construction contract or within ten days after its execution,
the surety will have priority over the "floating lien" of the lender. Note, supra note 16, at
593. Alternatively, a surety may achieve priority through a subordination agreement with
the lender. Id. This method has the advantage of forcing the surety and the lender to define
their respective rights before the principal's Chapter II proceeding and the distribution of
funds. See T. Leo, supra note 66, at 15. This will result in a decrease in surety-assignee
litigation and lower the cost of defining rights to contract funds after default by a contrac-
tor. See Note, supra note 22, at 594-95. Because the rights of each party are defined
initially, each method will reduce the likelihood of an expensive dispute.
112. See R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 40.
113. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 391 (legal assignment gives surety broader
rights than equitable subrogation).
114. J. Sheak & T. Korzun, supra note 70, at 19 n.39; see, e.g., Anderson v. United
States, 561 F.2d 162, 167 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that surety's equitable subrogation
rights "in no event existed beyond the extent necessary to reimburse itself for expenditures
made in fulfilling its obligations under the bonds"); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank,
540 So. 2d 113, 117 (Fla. 1989) ("Priority based on equitable subrogation in one contract
does not provide priority in excess funds from another contract.").
115. For simplicity this illustration assumes zero retainage. This assumption does not
affect the outcome of this example.
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struction projects governed by the Miller Act, the contractor
would be required to obtain payment and performance bonds."1 6
Assume the contractor defaults on both projects nine months
later, after earning $90,000 and receiving $80,000 per project
with $40,000 per project remaining in the government-owner's
hands. 117 The surety then enters the project, compensates unpaid
laborers and materialmen, and completes the projects at a cost of
$60,000 for the K1 job and $25,000.for the K2 job. If the surety
perfects its security interest in the contract funds due and payable
under each contract, the surety's net loss would be only $5,000,
$85,000 total cost incurred under the bonds less the $80,000 in
contract funds received. This is because the surety can apply the
surplus funds from K2 against the loss incurred on K1. If, on the
other hand, the surety seeks reimbursement solely under the doc-
trine of equitable subrogation, its net loss will be larger. The
surety will receive contract funds in an amount equal to the lesser
of its costs incurred or the amount of the undisbursed funds for
each project. Thus, it will receive the $40,000 balance for pay-
ments and performance under K1, but only $25,000 for K2, re-
sulting in a net loss of $20,000 ($85,000 - $65,000).
C. Procurement of a Security Interest in the Contractor's
Material and Equipment
The surety should file its indemnity agreement under the
U.C.C. because filing provides the surety with a perfected security
interest in the contractor's other assets, such as materials and
equipment used in the course of construction. Equitable subroga-
tion rights do not reach these assets.1 8 The indemnity agreement
generally includes an assignment of materials and equipment used
116. See.supra note 8.
117. In other words, the government-owner would be holding $10,000 in earned but
unpaid progress payments and $30,000 in unearned progress payments.
118. See R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 13, 36-37; T. Leo, supra note 66,
at 16 (surety's decision to file depends on its willingness to make the effort to perfect and
monitor the security interest); see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Bunken, 357 F Supp.
290, 293 (D.S.D. 1973) (failure to file and perfect Article 9 security interests in compli-
ance with U.C.C. 9-102 provisions is fatal to a surety's claim on personal property); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Leach (In re Merts Equip. Co.), 438 F Supp. 295, 298
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1977) ("The surety cannot accede to the general assets of the contractor
absent some assignment of title or attachment through a perfected security interest.");
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Clark, 254 So. 2d 741, 747 (Miss. 1971) (assignment contained in
a bond application cannot create security interest in proceeds of other projects without
compliance with U.C.C. provisions).
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by the contractor in performing the construction project in addi-
tion to an assignment of contract funds.11 9 However, the lender
typically obtains an assignment of these items as well. 120 By
perfecting its security interest in these assets as the first to file12'
or by asserting its interest as a purchase money security inter-
est,122 the surety will ensure that its right to these assets is supe-
rior to the lender's right. Since contract funds remaining in the
hands of the owner are often grossly insufficient to reimburse the
surety for amounts expended pursuant to the performance or pay-
ment bonds, it behooves the surety to file its security interest.123
Perfecting a security interest in materials and equipment
could entail greater time and expense than perfecting a security
interest in the contract funds.'24 However, when faced with tre-
mendous discrepancies between amounts expended under the
bonds and contract funds available for reimbursement, these addi-
119. See Withers, supra note 1, at 357 n.3. Withers's model indemnity agreement
contains a clause assigning to the surety "all machinery, equipment, plant tools and materi-
als which are now, or may hereafter be, about or upon the site of said work or elsewhere
" Id.
120. This is frequently the case where the lender has filed a dragnet financing state-
ment. Such financing statements, then, encompass the contractor's interest in equipment
and inventory, as well as his interest in contract funds. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 389.
The lender's security interest in materials derives from the assignment of the contrac-
tor's "inventory" The U.C.C. defines inventory as goods which are "held by a person who
holds them for sale or lease or to be furnished under .contracts of service or if he has so
furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in progress or materials used or con-
sumed in a business." U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1989). The Official Comment to this section
states in pertinent part that:
Goods to be furnished under a contract of service are inventory even though the
arrangement under which they are furnished is not technically a sale In
general it may be said that goods used in a business are inventory, even
though not held for sale, if they are used up or consumed in a short period of
time in the production of some end product.
U.C.C. § 9-109 official comment 3 (1989). Pursuant to section 9-109, materials used by the
contractor during the construction work constitute "inventory" For a further discussion,
see R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 23.
121. See R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 27-28; see also supra note 12
(discussing how U.C.C. prioritizes security interests).
122. See supra note 111.
123. For example, the surety in National Shawmut incurred performance bond ex-
penses of approximately $97,000, while the earned but unpaid progress payments it sought
totalled only $44,202.05. National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 441
F.2d 843, 844, reh g denied, 441 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969). In Pearlman the surety who had
discharged payment bond claims of approximately $350,000 was seeking reimbursement
from retamage amounting to only $87,737.35. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S.
132, 134 (1962).
124. See T. Leo, supra note 66, at 15.
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tional expenditures are easily justified.12 5
D. "Nothing to Lose"
Other than added time, effort, and expense, 126 the surety has
nothing to lose by filing an indemnity agreement under the U.C.C.
Filing is not a waiver of any rights the surety enjoys under the
equitable subrogation doctrine.1 27 The surety that files its indem-
nity agreement only strengthens its secured position - it does not
relinquish or waive any rights.
V A CASE FOR PARTIAL ABROGATION OF THE EQUITABLE
SUBROGATION DOCTRINE IN THE CONSTRUCTION SURETY
CONTEXT
By affording the surety an opportunity to claim the undis-
bursed contract proceeds whether it files its security interest or
not, the majority position violates the long established principle
that equitable remedies are available only where there is no ade-
quate remedy at law 128 Since the surety can, in most cases, fully
protect its interest in the contract funds by filing its indemnity
agreement, there is no need to clothe it with equitable rights. 29
125. Some commentators contend that by perfecting a security interest in materials
and equipment, the surety might disrupt the construction process by restricting the con-
tractor's ability to obtain financing or by violating the loan agreement between the contrac-
tor and construction lender through the creation of a lien on the contractor's assets. See T.
Leo, supra note 66, at 14; R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 39. However, these
problems can be alleviated by the surety and lender meeting "to define relative rights
before the problems arise." R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 39-40. One possible
solution may be the execution of subordination agreements with respect to certain assets, to
ensure that both surety and lender are secured adequately, without occupying a position of
"over-security" at the expense of each other or other creditors. See Note, supra note 16, at
594. Moreover, early cooperation by the surety and lender may help to avoid later disputes
which could erupt into costly litigation. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Smith
and Covalt point out that, insofar as loan proceeds were used to purchase materials or
equipment, a lender may hold a purchase money security interest superior to the prior
perfecting surety's interest. R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 36.
126. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
127. R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 38; see also Canter v. Schlager, 358
Mass. 789, 267 N.E.2d 492 (1971) (filing under the U.C.C. is not necessary to preserve the
surety's rights, nor does it affect the surety's rights under law or equity).
128. See Note, supra note 88, at 933; R. Smith & V Covalt, supra note 38, at 38-
39.
129. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 394:
Prior to the Code, the surety could justifiably plead that it was without an ade-
quate legal remedy and was entitled to recourse to equity, where it could assert
subrogation. However, the law, through the Code, has provided a remedy where
1990]
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The evolution of suretyship from the time when the equitable
subrogation doctrine was devised suggests the need for evolution
in the law governing sureties. No longer is the typical surety a
relative guaranteeing the debts or obligations of a family member.
Rather, the contemporary performance or payment bond surety is
generally an insurance company, which, as a profit-motivated en-
tity, sets bond premium rates by engaging in complex actuarial
calculations.130 Thus, in addition to being able to protect itself by
perfecting a security interest in the contract proceeds, the surety
has the ability to spread the risk of contractor default throughout
the construction industry 131
The purpose of U.C.C. Article 9 is to simplify the formalities
required to create security interests, in order to allow a greater
number of secured transactions to proceed "with less cost and
with greater certainty "132 In addition, section 1-102 provides that
the policies and purposes of the Code are, inter alia, "to simplify,
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions
[and] to make uniform the law among the various jurisdic-
tions.' 13  Given the characteristics of the modern day construction
surety and that the surety is able to protect itself under the
U.C.C., 3 4 subjecting the surety's interest in undisbursed contract
proceeds to the provisions of Article 9 would further the proffered
goals of simplicity, efficiency, modernization, and uniformity It
would either significantly reduce or put an end to litigation over
what one commentator has termed "the quarrel that will not
before one did not exist. Therefore, in cases such as Jacobs, the surety should be
denied access to equity. If the surety pleads that it is without an adequate rem-
edy at law, equity should not listen, since the inadequacy arises because of the
surety's own fault, in that it failed to file its legal assignment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
130. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 524 So. 2d 439, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988), rev d, 540 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1989) (the original purposes of equitable subroga-
tion do not exist in the context of modern sureties); see also G. OSBORNE, SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS CASES AND MATERIALS, 7-9 (1967) (drawing a distinction between professional
surety and traditional "warm hearted but imprudent" surety).
131. See Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Bank of Am., 57 Cal. App. 3d 241, 129
Cal. Rptr. 91 (1976). Commercial Standard involved a surety's negligence claim against a
bank which advanced construction funds to a contractor in violation of the construction
loan agreement. The court, although holding in favor of the surety, expressed reservations
due to the surety's superior risk spreading capability as compared to that of the bank. Id.
132. U.C.C § 9-101 official comment (1989).
133. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1989).




The equitable subrogation doctrine should complement Arti-
cle 9 of the U.C.C. in governing surety-lender disputes over undis-
bursed contract proceeds. Under this approach, sureties should be
allowed to recover pursuant to equitable subrogation only where
filing in accordance with the U.C.C. would not afford legal protec-
tion. For example, in jurisdictions which hold that the contractor
forfeits the right to earned but unpaid progress payments upon
default,138 the surety does not possess an adequate remedy at law
under the U.C.C.'3 7 In such cases, resort to equitable subrogation
allows the surety to recover the funds. Conversely, in those juris-
dictions which hold that defaulting contractors have an interest in
earned but unpaid progress payments,""8 the surety is able to
claim the funds by means of its perfected U.C.C. security interest.
This limitation on the equitable subrogation doctrine preserves the
principle that equity should not intervene where an adequate rem-
edy at law is available.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note has argued that it is prudent for the performance or
payment bond surety to file under U.C.C. Article 9 the indemnity
agreement entered into with the contractor. Generally, filing is in
the best interests of the surety and affords it maximum protection.
Such protection will allow sureties to continue to insure that con-
struction projects will be completed even when there has been a
default by the contractor. Moreover, it is in each party's interest,
as well as that of the public, that construction jobs come to
fruition.1 3
This note has advocated a partial rejection of the equitable
135. Dunne, The Quarrel That Will Not Die - Financing Bank vs. Construction
Surety, 106 BANKING L.J. 115, 115 (1989).
136. See, e.g., National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 411 F.2d
843, 848, reh'g denied, 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) (holding that defaulting contractor
forfeits rights to earned but unpaid progress payments).
137. An assignee acquires an interest in collateral only to the extent of the assignor's
interest. In this case the assignor's interest in the collateral is zero due to the forfeiture.
138. See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Glover Constr. Co. (In re Glover Constr.
Co.), 30 Bankr. 873, 876 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (holding that the defaulting contractor
had "an undeniable legal and equitable interest in the progress payments").
139. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnett Bank, 540 So. 2d 113, 117 (Fla. 1989)
("The interests of all concerned parties, whether they be contractors in default, nonsurety
assignees, owners, or other obligees, are best served by prompt performance by the
surety.").
19901
328 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:305
subrogation doctrine as applied to surety-lender disputes over un-
disbursed contract proceeds. Such a rejection would not adversely
affect the filing surety's prospects for reimbursement and would
eliminate redundancies between law and equity
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